We introduce signatures where signers can only sign messages that conform to some policy, yet privacy of the policy is maintained. We provide definitions and show that policy-based signatures provide a framework which yields a unified view of many other existing types of signatures that now appear as special cases. We also show how still other primitives are easily realized using policy-based signatures as a building block. We provide generic constructions of policy-based signatures and then show how to achieve them efficiently.
authority can trace group signatures to their signer). In attribute-based signatures (ABS), users hold keys corresponding to their attributes and can sign messages with respect to a policy, which is a predicate over attributes. Users should only be able make signatures for policies that are satisfied by their attributes. Privacy for ABS means that a signature should reveal nothing about the attributes related to the key under which it was produced, other than the fact that it satisfies the policy.
In the models of primitives such as attribute-based signatures or mesh signatures, the policy itself is always public, as is the warrant, which specifies the policy in (even anonymous) proxy signatures. We ask whether this is a natural limitation of privacy notions, and whether it is inherently unavoidable that objects like the policy (which specify why the message could be signed) need to be public.
Consider the example of a company implementing a scheme where each employee gets a signing key and there is one public key which is used by outsiders to verify signatures in the name of the company. A group-signature scheme would allow every employee holding a key to sign on behalf of the company, but there is no fine-grained control over who is allowed to sign which documents. This can be achieved using attribute-based signatures, where each user is assigned attributes, and a message is signed with respect to a policy like (CEO or (board member and general manager)). However, it is questionable whether a verifier needs to know the company-internal policy used to sign a specific message, and there is no apparent reason he should know; all he needs to be assured of is that the message was signed by someone entitled to, but not who this person is, what she is entitled to sign, nor whether two messages were signed by the same person.
Another issue is that when using ABS we have to assume that the verifier can tell which messages can be signed under which policies. An attribute-based signature which is valid under the policy (CEO or intern) tells a verifier that it could have been produced by an intern, but it does not provide any guarantees as to whether an intern would have been entitled to sign the message. We ask whether it is possible to avoid having these types of public policies at all. PBS answers this in the affirmative.
The use of NIZKs for signatures begins with [BG90] , who built an ordinary signature scheme from a NIZK, a PRF and a committment scheme. Encryption and ordinary signatures were combined with NIZKs to create group signatures in [BMW03] . Our first generic construction builds on these ideas. Our second generic construction, inspired by [BMT13] , exploits the power of simulation-sound extractable NIZKs to give a conceptually simpler scheme that, in addition to the NIZK, uses only an ordinary signature scheme.
Preliminaries
Notations and conventions. The empty string is denoted by ε. If x is a (binary) string then |x| is its length, x[i] is its i-th bit and x[i, j] = x[i] . . . x[j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |x|. If S is a finite set then |S| denotes its size and s ←$ S denotes picking an element uniformly from S and assigning it to s. For i ∈ N we let [i] = {1, . . . , i}. We denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter and by 1 λ its unary representation.
Algorithms are randomized unless otherwise indicated. "PT" stands for "polynomial-time." By y ← A(x 1 , . . . ; R), we denote the operation of running algorithm A on inputs x 1 , . . . and coins R and letting y denote the output. By y ←$ A(x 1 , . . .), we denote the operation of letting y ← A(x 1 , . . . ; R) with R chosen at random. We denote by [A(x 1 , . . .)] the set of points that have positive probability of being output by A on inputs x 1 , . . .. Adversaries are algorithms or tuples of algorithms. In the latter case, the running time of the adversary is the sum of the running times of all the algorithms in the tuple.
A map R : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is said to be an NP-relation if it is computable in time polynomial in the length of its first input. For x ∈ {0, 1} * we let WS R (x) = {w : R(x, w) = 1} be the witness set of x. We let L(R) = {x : WS R (x) = ∅} be the language associated to R. The fact that R is an NP-relation means that L(R) ∈ NP.
Game-playing framework. For our security definitions and proofs we use the code-based game-playing framework of [BR06] . A game Exp (Figure 1 , for example) consists of a finite number of procedures. We 
Figure 1: Games defining unforgeability and indistinguishability for PBS. execute a game with an adversary A and security parameter λ ∈ N as follows. The adversary gets 1 λ as input. It can then query game procedures. Its first query must be to Initialize with argument 1 λ , and its last to Finalize, and these must be the only queries to these oracles. In between it can query the other oracles as it wishes. The output of the execution, denoted Exp A (λ) is the output of Finalize. We denote by Exp A (λ) ⇒ y the event that this output is y. In code, boolean flags are assumed initialized to false, sets to ∅, integers to 0 and array entries to ⊥. The running time of the adversary A is a function of λ in which oracle calls are assumed to take unit time.
Policy-Based Signatures
We now formally define policy-based signatures. A policy checker is an NP-relation PC : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. The first input is a pair (p, m) representing a policy p ∈ {0, 1} * and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , while the second input is a witness w ∈ {0, 1} * . The associated language L(PC) = {(p, m) : WS PC ((p, m)) = ∅} is called the policy language associated to PC. That (p, m) ∈ L(PC) means that signing m is permitted under policy p. We say that (p, m, w) is PC-valid if PC((p, m), w) = 1.
A policy-based signature scheme PBS = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) is a 4-tupe of PT algorithms: (1) Setup : On input the unary-encoded security parameter 1 λ , setup algorithm Setup returns public parameters pp and a master secret key msk. (2) KeyGen : On input msk, p, where p ∈ {0, 1} * is a policy, key-generation algorithm KeyGen outputs a signing key sk for p. (3) Sign : On input sk, m, w, where m ∈ {0, 1} * is a message and w ∈ {0, 1} * is a witness, signing algorithm Sign outputs a signature σ. (4) Verify : On input pp, m, σ, verification algorithm Verify outputs a bit. We say that the scheme is correct relative to policy checker PC if for all λ ∈ N, all PC-valid (p, m, w), all (pp, msk) ∈ [Setup(1 λ )] and all σ ∈ [Sign(KeyGen(msk, p), m, w)] we have Verify(pp, m, σ) = 1.
Unforgeability. Our basic unforgeability requirement is that it is hard to create a valid signature of m without holding a key for some policy p such that (p, m) ∈ L(PC). The formalization is based on game Exp Indistinguishability. Privacy for policy-based signatures requires that a signature not reveal the policy associated to the key and neither the witness that was used to create the signature. A first idea would be the following formalization: an adversary outputs a message m, two policies p 0 , p 1 , and two witnesses w 0 , w 1 , such that both (p 0 , m, w 0 ) and (p 1 , m, w 1 ) are PC-valid. For either p 0 or p 1 the experiment computes a secret key and uses it to produce a signature on m and gives it to the adversary, who wins if he can guess which policy was used. It turns out that this notion is too weak, as it does not guarantee that two signatures produced under the same secret key do not link, as seen as follows. Consider a scheme satisfying the security notion just sketched and modify it by attaching to each secret key a random string during key generation and alter Sign to append to the signature the random string contained in the secret key. Clearly, two signatures under the same key are linkable, but yet the scheme satisfies the definition. We therefore give the adversary the secret keys for both policies and a signature under one of them.
Let Exp IND PBS,A be the game defined on the right of Figure 1 . we say that PBS has indistinguishability if for all PT adversaries A we have that Adv
We assume that either all policy descriptions p are of equal length, or we require that A output p 0 and p 1 with |p 0 | = |p 1 |.
Unlinkability could be formalized via a game where an adversary is given two signatures and must decide whether they were created using the same key. Indistinguishability implies unlinkability, as an adversary against the latter could be used to build another one against indistinguishability, who can simulate the unlinkability game by using the received signing keys to produce signatures.
Simulatability and Extractability
We now argue why the intuitively appealing notions of unforgeability and indistinguishability are unsatisfactory, in that they do not provide the level of security one hopes for. Moreover, it cannot be efficiently verified whether an adversary has won the unforgeability game, as this involves checking whether (p, m) ∈ L(PC) for all p queried to MakeSK and m from the adversary's final output. We thus replace unforgeability by an efficiently verifiable notion: extractability requires that from a valid signature, using a trapdoor one can extract a policy and a valid witness. To satisfy this notion, a signature must contain information on the policy and can thus not hide its length. For simplicity, we assume from now on that all policies are of the same length.
Simulatability. It turns out that even our strengthened notion of indistinguishability is too weak, in that it does not provide any security when the policy checker PC is such that for a message m there is only one p with (p, m) ∈ L(PC). (See our construction of group signatures in Section 6 for an example of such a PC.) To see why, consider a scheme which satisfies indistinguishability. Now modify the scheme so that the signing algorithm appends the policy to the signature. This scheme does evidently not hide the policy, yet still satisfies indistinguishability: In Exp This issue can be overcome using a simulation-based definition: there is a simulator which can create simulated signatures without having access to any signing key or witness; and these signatures are indistinguishable from real signatures. We formalize simulatability by requiring that there exist the following algorithms: SimSetup, which outputs parameters and a master key that are indistinguishable from those output by Setup and a trapdoor; SKeyGen, which outputs keys indistinguishable from those output by KeyGen; and SimSign, which on input the trapdoor and a message (but no signing key nor witness) produces signatures that are indistinguishable from regular signatures.
In particular, with Exp SIM PBS defined on the left in Figure 2 , we require that for every PT adversary A we have Adv
2 is negligible in λ. Note that in all our instantiations, tr will contain msk and SKeyGen will be defined as KeyGen. We included SKeyGen to make the definition more general.
Extractability. The notion of soundness for a NIZK proof system for an NP-relation R asks that it be impossible to produce a proof π which is valid for a statement x, although x / ∈ L(R). This has been strengthened to simulation soundness by Sahai [Sah99] , stating that this even holds after the adversary has seen simulated proofs on statements of his choice. Since membership in L(R) may not be efficiently verifiable, it might not be efficiently decidable whether an adversary has broken soundness or not. The same holds for our notion of unforgeability, where Finalize checks whether (
Although not a problem in itself, it can become one, for example when using the notion in a proof by game hopping, as a distinguisher between two games must efficiently determine whether an adversary has won the game. (See Appendix A for a proof that relies on this fact.)
For zero-knowledge proofs, the efficiently verifiable notion of extractability has been put forth [DMP88] to replace soundness: there exists an efficient extractor, which from a valid proof must extract a valid witness. If it fails to do so, the adversary wins. (Since there is no witness for an invalid statement, an adversary breaking soundness necessarily breaks extractability.) Extractability has been combined with simulation soundness by Groth [Gro06] . We define our notion in the same spirit (which is also that of "sim-ext" security for signatures of knowledge [CL06] Figure 2 . We say that PBS has extractability if there exists an algorithm Extr, which taking a trapdoor, a message and a signature outputs a pair (p, w) ∈ {0, 1} * , such that Adv EXT PBS,A (·) is negligible for every PT A. Although the definition might not seem completely intuitive at first, it implies that, as long as the adversary outputs a valid message/signature pair and does not simply copy a SimSign query/response pair, the only signed messages it can output are those that satisfy the policy of one of the queried keys: assume A outputs (m * , σ * ) such that ( * ) for all p ∈ Q K : (p, m * ) / ∈ L(PC). Then let (p * , w * ) ← Extr(tr, m, σ). If PC((p * , m * ), w * ) = 0, the adversary wins Exp EXT PBS . On the other hand, if PC((p * , m * ), w * ) = 1 then (p * , m * ) ∈ L(PC), thus by ( * ) we have p * / ∈ Q K and it wins too. Note that this notion corresponds to strong unforgeability for signature schemes.
Sim-Ext security implies indistinguishability and unforgeability. In Appendix A we show that our two latter security notions are indeed strengthenings of the former two: Theorem 1. Any policy-based signature scheme which satisfies simulatability satisfies indistinguishability. Any PBS scheme which satisfies simulatability and extractability satisfies unforgeability.
Instantiations of Policy-Based Signatures

Generic Instantiation
We now show how to instantiate policy-based signatures satisfying simulatability and extractability (and, by Theorem 1, indistinguishability and unforgeability) for any NP-relation PC. A first approach could be the following, similar to the generic construction of group signatures in [BMW03] : The issuer creates a signature key pair (mvk, msk) and publishes mvk as pp; each user creates a key pair (vk U , sk U ). When a user is issued a key for a policy p, the issuer signs p vk U and sends this certificate to the user. Now in order to sign a message m, the user first signs it using his personal key sk U , establishing thus a chain mvk → vk U → m via the certificate and the signature. In order to remain anonymous, the actual signature is a (zero-knowledge) proof of knowledge of such a chain and the fact that the message satisfies the policy signed in the certificate.
While this approach would yield a scheme satisfying indistinguishability and unforgeability, it would fail to achieve extractability. We thus choose a different approach: The user's key is simply a signature from the issuer on the policy. Now to sign a message, the user first picks a key pair (ovk, osk) for a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme 1 and makes a zero-knowledge proof π that he knows either (I) an issuer signature on a policy p such that (p, m) ∈ L(PC) or (II) an issuer signature on ovk. Finally, he adds a signature on both the message and the proof of knowledge under ovk. As we will see, this construction satisfies both SIM (where the simulator can make a signature on ovk and use clause (II) for the proof) and EXT (as π is a proof of knowledge).
We formalize the above: Let Sig = (KeyGen sig , Sign sig , Verify sig ) be a digital signature scheme, OtSig = (KeyGen ots , Sign ots , Verify ots ) a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme and let PKE = (KeyGen pke , Enc, Dec) be an IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme. For a policy checker PC, we define the following NP-relation:
In such a scheme it must be infeasible for an adversary, after receiving a verification key ovk and after obtaining a signature σ on one message m of his choice, to output a signature σ * on a message m * , such that (m, σ) = (m * , σ * ).
and tr ← (msk, dk)
Figure 3: Generic instantiation of PBS Let NIZK = (Setup nizk , Prove, Verify nizk ) be a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system for L(R NP ). Our instantiation PBS for a policy checker PC is detailed in Figure 3 , and in Appendix B we prove the following:
Theorem 2. If PKE satisfies IND-CPA, Sig is unforgeable under chosen-message attack, OtSig is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme and NIZK is a NIZK proof system for L(R NP ) then PBS[PKE, Sig, OtSig, NIZK], defined in Figure 3 , satisfies simulatability and extractability.
We now present a much simpler construction of PBS by relying on a more advanced cryptographic primitive: simulation-sound extractable (SSE) NIZK proofs [Gro06] (see Appendix E for the definition). Let Sig = (KeyGen sig , Sign sig , Verify sig ) be a signature scheme and for a policy checker PC let NIZK = (Setup zk , Prove zk , Verify zk , SimSetup zk , SimProve zk , Extr zk ) be an SSE-NIZK for the following NP-relation, whose statements are of the form X = (vk, m) with witnesses W = (p, c, w) and
Then the scheme in Figure 4 is a PBS for PC which satisfies simulatability and extractability.
Efficient Instantiation via Groth-Sahai Proofs
Our efficient instantiation will be defined over a bilinear group. This is a tuple (p, G, H, T, G, H), where G, H and T are groups of prime order p, generated by G and H, respectively, and e : G × H → T is a bilinear map such that e(G, H) generates T. We denote the group operation multiplicatively and let 1 G and 1 H denote the neutral elements of G and H. Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08] let us prove that there exists a set of elements (X 1 , . . . , X n , Y 1 , . . . , Y ) ∈ G n × H which satisfy equations E( X, Y ) of the form
Figure 4: PBS based on SSE NIZKs.
Such an equation E is called a pairing-product equation 2 (PPE) and is uniquely defined by its constants P , Q, A, B and Γ :
These equations have already found many uses in cryptography, of which the following two are relevant in our context: they can define the verification predicate of a digital signature (see [AFG + 10] and the discussion therein), or witness the fact that a ciphertext encrypts a certain value (see Appendix F). Groth and Sahai define a setup algorithm which on input a bilinear group outputs a common-reference string crs and an extraction key xk. On input crs, an equation E and a satisfying witness ( X, Y ), algorithm Prove gs outputs a proof π. Proofs are verified by Verify gs (crs, E(·, ·), π). Under the SXDH assumption (see [GS08] for the definition), Groth-Sahai proofs are witness-indistinguishable [FS90] , that is, proofs for an equation using different witnesses are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, they are extractable: From every valid proof π, Extr gs (xk, E(·, ·), π) extracts a witness ( X, Y ) such that E( X, Y ) = 1, which means proofs are sound proofs of knowledge [DMP88] .
When using Groth-Sahai proofs, we can define the following type of policy checker: the policy p defines an equation E p as in (2) and PC((p, m), w) = 1 iff E p (m, w) = 1, where m ∈ G nm × H m and w ∈ G nw × H w . Now in order to hide the policy, we swap the roles of constants and variables, as this will enable us to hide the policy defined by the constants. Since Groth-Sahai proofs only allow us to prove knowledge of group elements, we first need to transform equations of the above form into a set of equivalent equations that do not contain exponents. To do so, we introduce auxiliary variables Y ij , add i · j new equations and define the set E (no-c) as follows:
) satisfies the set of equations E (no-c) in (3). Now we can swap the roles of constants and variables; that is, show that a (clear) message ( M , N ) satisfies a "hidden" policy defined by equation E, witnessed by elements ( V , W ), as we detail below.
Our second building block are structure-preserving signatures [AFG + 10], which were designed to be combined with Groth-Sahai proofs: their keys, messages and signatures consist only of elements from G and H and signatures are verified by evaluating PPEs. Groth-Sahai proofs let us prove knowledge of keys, messages, and/or signatures such that these values satisfy signature verification, without revealing anything beyond this fact.
Instantiation with Groth-Sahai proofs and structure-preserving signatures. To instantiate PBS, we let (Setup gs , Prove gs , Verify gs , Extr gs ) denote the Groth-Sahai proof system for PPEs, and let (KeyGen sp , Sign sp , Verify sp ) be a structure-preserving signature scheme that can sign vectors of group elements (e.g. one from [AFG + 10]), for which we let V(vk, m, σ) denote the set of equations representing Verify sp (vk, m, σ). Moreover, we let (KeyGen ots , Sign ots , Verify ots ) be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme whose verification keys are group elements (e.g. one from [AFG + 10]). In the following we define a policy-based-signature scheme which follows closely the generic construction and whose security is proved analogously. Since Groth-Sahai proofs are proofs of knowledge, we do not need to encrypt the witnesses as in the generic construction.
One technically is that we need to express disjunctions as (the conjunction of) sets of equations. We do so by following Groth's approach in [Gro06] . We have to express the relation R NP defined in Equation (1) 
However, if T = 1 G then the only satisfying assignment to Q i is Q i and thus X, Y must satisfy the original equation E. In order to express a disjunction of two equations E 1 ( V , W ) and E 2 ( X, Y ), we convert them to E (sim) 1
( X, Y )(T 2 ), respectively, and add the following equation E T : e(T 1 · T 2 · G −1 , H) = 1. Now if we have a witness ( V , W ) for E 1 , we can set T 1 ← G and T 2 , ← 1 G (and X ← 1 G and Y ← 1 H ); whereas if we have a witness for E 2 , we set T 1 ← 1 G and T 2 ← G. In both cases we get a witness for the set
). However, E T prevents us from setting both T 1 ← 1 G and T 2 ← 1 G , which means we must have a witness for either E 1 or E 2 . Note that this only works if the equations do not share any variables.
The transform E (sim) of a set of equations E (no-c) defined in (3) can be simplified by merely replacing the equations e(G, Y ij ) = e(G γ ij , Y j ) by e(T , Y ij ) = e(G γ ij , Y j ). If T = G then we are back in the situation of E (no-c) . However, if T = 1 G then setting all variables to 1 G or 1 H , respectively, is a satisfying assignment for the transform.
Policy checkers for PPEs. Our policy checker PC for a policy p = ( P , Q, A, B, K, L, Γ = (γ ij ), ∆ = (δ ij ), Φ = (φ ij ), Ψ = (ψ ij )), a message m = ( M , N ) ∈ G nm × H m and a witness w = ( V , W ) ∈ G nw × H w is defined as follows:
which is the most general form of a PPE over variables M , N , V and W . Note that we assume that all policies are of a fixed length, since we cannot hide the form of the set of equations they define. Analogously to the transformation of E → E (no-c) in (3), we express the exponents γ ij , δ ij , φ ij , ψ ij (which are part of the policy) as group elements and make the equations simulatable by introducing variables T , N
(1)
ij , and corresponding equations. We define:
Figure 5: Instantiation of PBS with Groth-Sahai proofs and structure-preserving signatures
is the only satisfying assignment, and thus p and w need to satisfy the original equation. However, when T = 1 G then we can set all other variables to 1 G or 1 H as well.
Finally, in order to sign a policy (which contains the matrices Γ, ∆, Φ, Ψ with entries in Z p ), for any Ξ = (ξ ij ) ij , we define the projection onto G as Ξ (prj) := (G ξ ij ) ij . Henceforth, we assume that policies are given with their exponents projected to G. We are now ready to express the generic equation in (1) as a set of pairing-product equations E (disj) as follows. (Since the clauses of the disjunction must not have common variables, we use S 1 and S 2 for the signatures by the issuer.)
Now that we have defined all the required concepts, our instantiation of PBS using Groth-Sahai proofs and structure-preserving signatures is quite straightforward. We present it in Figure 5 . Security is proven analogously to that of the scheme in Figure 3 . Extractability follows from unforgeability of Sig sp and strong unforgeability of OtSig, whereas simulatability follows from witness indistinguishability of Groth-Sahai proofs. Note that since we directly use a proof of knowledge, we need not simulate proofs as there are no ciphertexts, but instead simply change the witness used by Sign to the witness used by SimSign.
A simple use case. Messages that are elements of bilinear groups and policies demanding that they satisfy pairing-product equations will prove useful to construct other cryptographic schemes like group signatures. However, our pairing-based instantiation might seem too abstract for deploying PBS to manage signing rights in a company-one of the motivations given in the introduction. This is however not the case, as the following simple example shows: A company issues keys to their employees which should allow them to sign only messages h m that start with a particular header h. This can be implemented by mapping messages h m to (F (h), F (m)) via a collision-resistant hash function F : {0, 1} * → G. The policy p * restricting signing to messages with a header h * can then be expressed as PC((p * , h m)) = 1 ⇔ e(F (h * ), H) e(F (h), H −1 ) = 1, which ensures h = h * . Another possibility would be to additionally demand that an employee hold a credential, of which the required type could even depend on h * , which she must use as a witness when signing. (There are numerous instantiations of credentials (digital signatures) which are verified via PPEs; see e.g. [AFG + 10].)
Attribute-Based Signatures from Policy-Based Signatures
In attribute-based signatures (ABS) a trusted setup produces parameters and a master secret key. The latter is then used to issue keys for sets of attributes from a universe A. Now a holder of such a key can sign messages w.r.t. to a predicate Υ over attributes, which must evaluate to 1 on the set of attributes for the key. The predicate is in the clear, so verification of a signature is w.r.t. the predicate.
The Model. In view of a generalization to multiple authorities, Maji et al. [MPR11] separate the setup algorithm into a trusted setup TSetup, which outputs public parameters tpk and ASetup, run by the attribute-issuing authority, which outputs a public/private key pair (apk, ask).
For the single-authority case (which we consider), TSetup and ASetup can be combined to Setup without weakening security: In the unforgeability game, both TSetup and ASetup are run by the experiment impersonating the attribute-issuing authority. Moreover, even though not explicitly stated, privacy also requires the pair (apk, ask) ←$ ASetup to be set up honestly. 3 For privacy, the adversary impersonates thus an "honest but curious" authority, which we model by giving the adversary the authority's secret key. Since security of our scheme is extraction-based, we cannot hope to achieve perfect privacy (meaning signatures produced with keys for different sets of attributes are distributed equally); we thus give a computational analog. We give a formal definition of the model.
We denote the message space by M. A scheme ABS is parametrized by an attribute universe A.
A claim predicate over A is a monotone boolean function Υ : P(A) → {0, 1}. On input the security parameter 1 λ , Setup outputs public parameters pp and the authority's secret key ask. On input ask and Construction. Let Y denote the set of all monotone boolean functions over A. We define a policy checker PC for our policy-based signature PBS which instantiates ABS. A policy is a set A ⊆ A and a message for PBS is in Y × M, i.e., a claim predicate and the actual message. A PBS message satisfies a policy if the set of attributes defining the policy satisfy the predicate contained in the message. The policy checker PC for PBS is efficiently decidable (thus no witnesses are required) and is defined as:
Let PBS = (Setup pbs , KeyGen pbs , Sign pbs , Verify pbs ) be a policy-based signature scheme for PC. We define ABS[PBS] = (Setup, AttrGen, Sign, Verify) as follows:
Theorem 3. If PBS is a policy-based signature scheme satisfying indistinguishability and unforgeability then ABS[PBS] is an attribute-based signature scheme satisfying privacy and unforgeability.
The proof can be found in Appendix C. Using the strategy to express disjunctions of statements as sets of pairing-product equations outlined in Section 4.2, we can express PC as a set of PPEs and thus use our efficient PBS-implementation to construct an efficient ABS. We conclude by remarking that we could also instantiate key-policy ABS, where the key is associated with a predicate and the message with a set of attributes. We would simply define PC : Y × (A × M) → {0, 1}, PC(Υ, (A, m)) = Υ(A).
CCA-Secure Group Signatures from Policy-Based Signatures
The BMW Model. As defined in [BMW03] , a group signature scheme GS = (GKg, GSig, GVf, Open) is a 4-tuple of PT algorithms. On input the security parameter 1 λ and the group size 1 n , group-keygeneration algorithm GKg returns the group public key gpk, the manager's secret key gmsk and a vector of member secret keys gsk. On input gsk[i] and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , group signing algorithm GSig returns a group signature γ by member i on m. On input gpk, m, γ, verification algorithm GVf outputs a bit. On input gmsk, m, γ, the opening algorithm Open returns an identity i ∈ [n] or ⊥.
We say that GS is correct if for all λ, n ∈ N, all (gpk, gmsk, gsk) ←$ GKg(1 λ , 1 n ), all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and all m ∈ {0, 1} * , we have GVf(gpk, m, GSig(gsk we allow the adversary only one call to his LR oracle. We say that GS is fully Construction. We show how to construct group signatures (GS) from a CCA-secure public key encryption scheme and policy-based signatures. Since the former can be constructed from the latter (as we show in Appendix E), this means that PBS imply GS. The main idea is to define a group signature as a ciphertext plus a PBS. When making a group signature on a message m, a member is supposed to encrypt her identity as c and then sign (c, m). The policy for which the member gets a PBS-key ensures that c must be an encryption of the member's identity.
Let PKE = (KeyGen pke , Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme satisfying IND-CCA and let PBS = (Setup, KeyGen pbs , Sign, Verify) be a PBS for the following NP-relation:
Our group-signature scheme GS[PKE, PBS] is defined as follows:
Theorem 4. If PBS is a policy-based signature scheme satisfying simulatability and extractability and PKE is a public-key encryption scheme satisfying IND-CCA then GS[PKE, PBS] is a group-signature scheme satisfying full anonymity and traceability.
The proof can be found in Appendix D. In Appendix F we give an encryption scheme such that (7) lies in the language of our efficient PBS from Section 4.2.
Other Primitives Implied by PBS
Simulation-sound extractable NIZK proofs. Groth [Gro06] introduced a notion of simulationsoundness for NIZK proofs of knowledge. It requires that even when an adversary is provided with an oracle for simulated proofs, it cannot produce a new valid proof from which the extractor fails to extract a witness. We refer to Appendix E for the definition and more details.
Let R be an NP-relation and let PC and p * be such that PC((p * , x), w) = R(x, w). Let PBS = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SimSetup, SKeyGen, SimSign, Extr) be a PBS for PC which satisfies simulatability and extractability. Then the following is a simulation-sound extractable NIZK proof system:
Public-key encryption. Interpreting policies as plaintexts hidden in a signature, which can be "decrypted" using Extr, PBS even imply public-key encryption: Let PBS be for PC s.t. PC((p, m * ), w * ) = 1 for some m * , w * and all p. Then the following as an IND-CPA secure PKE:
Using the results by Sahai [Sah99] , the above NIZK and PKE can be combined to construct a CCA-secure PKE from PBS. We refer to Appendix E for the details, where we also construct signatures of knowledge [CL06] from PBS. be a response of the Sign oracle. We then apply the extractor of PBS to get (p, w) and the adversary wins if either no secret key for p was ever revealed or if PC((p, m), w) = 0.
Claim. UF-(1) ⇒ UF.
We show how to use an adversary A winning UF to construct B which wins UF-(1). What makes the proof not quite straightforward is the fact that A might win UF by outputting a pair (m, σ) which is a query and response of the Sign oracle, 5 whereas this would make UF-(1) immediately return false, since (m, σ) ∈ Q S .
We start with the simpler case, where A never outputs a query/response pair from the Sign oracle. Our reduction B simply forwards all messages between its Exp * it forwarded when A queried RevealSK, otherwise B queries its own RevealSK oracle to get sk * . B computes σ * ←$ Sign(sk * , m * , w * ) and returns σ * . Every time A makes a Sign query involving m * , B also proceeds as just described. It is clear that this perfectly simulates A's oracles in UF.
Assume now that A wins by outputting (m * , σ * ) and that B guessed correctly. Since A wins, we have (1) Verify(pp, m * , σ * ) = 1. Since B guessed correctly, no entry in Q S starts with m * , thus (2) (m * , σ * ) / ∈ Q S . Let (p,w) ← Extr(tr, m * , σ * ). If no key forp was ever revealed then B wins. There are two ways that a key forp could have been revealed in UF-(1): either A queried RevealSK for it, or A made a Sign query involving m * (in which case B may have queried RevealSK). In either case, since A won UF, by its winning condition, we must have (p, m * ) / ∈ L(PC). A forteriori PC(p, m * ),w) = 0; thus, also in the case that keys forp were revealed, B wins.
Claim. EXT ∧ SIM ⇒ UF-(1).
By SIM, UF-(1) is indistinguishable from Exp
UF-(2)
PBS , given in Figure 8 , where we replaced Setup by SimSetup, KeyGen by SKeyGen and Sign by SimSign conditioned on the fact that the inputs satisfy PC. Note that it is because both games are efficiently decidable, that we can construct a distinguisher which uses an adversary behaving differently in the two games to break SIM.
It is now easy to see that any A winning UF-(2) can be used to construct B winning EXT. PBS,A . Our first change is that we replace crs ←$ Setup nizk (1 λ ) by crs ←$ SimSetup nizk (1 λ ) and in calls to Signature, we replace π by a simulated proof. This is indistinguishable by the zero-knowledge property of NIZK. Note that in this game, the 5 We note that winning UF this way can only happen if there exist p * , m * and w * , with PC((p * , m * ), w * ) = 0, but for which Sign(pp, KeyGen(pp, msk, p * ), m * , w * ) outputs a valid signature, which we have not explicitly excluded. However, by this very attack, this cannot happen in any scheme satisfying UF; neither in any scheme satisfying EXT and SIM, since we prove that they imply UF.
proof π can be computed knowing only (pk, mvk, C p , C s , C w , ovk, m), but not the content of C p , C s and C w nor their randomness.
In the next game, for the Signature calls, we replace the ciphertexts C p and C w by encryptions of 0 and C s by an encryption of a signature s ←$ Sign sig (msk, 0 ovk). This is indistinguishable by IND-CPA of PKE. In the final game, we replace the simulated CRS by a real CRS. This final game is Exp SIM|b = 0 PBS,A , which concludes the proof.
Extractability: This notion is reduced to the security of both Sig and OtSig. We distinguish two types of adversaries. Type 1 returns a forgery (m, (ovk, C p , C s , C w , π, τ )) such that there was a reply of a SimSign query with the same ovk, Type-2 adversaries return forgeries with a fresh ovk.
We use Type-1 adversaries to break strong unforgeability of OtSig. Given ovk * from our challenger, we simulate Exp EXT PBS,A except that for a randomly guessed valid SimSign query, say form, we use ovk * , computeĈ p ,Ĉ s ,Ĉ w andπ as per SimSign and complete the signature by querying our one-time oracle on (m,Ĉ p ,Ĉ s ,Ĉ w ,π) to getτ . Assume that the adversary A is of Type 1, then with non-negligible probability his forgery is of the form (m, σ = (ovk * , C p , C s , C w , π, τ )). Since, for A to have won, (m, σ) must be different from all query/response pairs for SimSign, in particular, it must be different from (m, (ovk * ,Ĉ p ,Ĉ s ,Ĉ w ,π,τ )), in which we embedded ovk * . Therefore ((m, C p , C s , C w , π), τ ) = ((m,Ĉ p ,Ĉ s ,Ĉ w ,π),τ ) and τ is a one-time forgery on (m, C p , C s , C w , π).
We now use Type-2 adversaries to break unforgeability of Sig. On receiving vk * from our challenger, we run crs ←$ Setup nizk (1 λ ) and (pk, dk) ←$ KeyGen pke (1 λ ). We run the adversary A on pp := (crs, pk, vk * ). When A makes an SKeyGen query, we compute sk p by querying our signing oracle on 1 p; when A makes a SimSign query, we use our oracle to get a signature s on 0 ovk and use that as a witness for the proof π in our PBS σ.
Suppose A wins the game by outputting (m, σ = (ovk, C p , C s , π, τ )), which satisfies Verify. Using Extr, we get p ← Dec(dk, C p ) and w ← Dec(dk, C w ); additionally, we compute s ← Dec(dk, C s ). As σ is valid, soundness of NIZK and correctness of PKE imply that either (i) s is a valid signature on 1 p and PC((p, m), w) = 1; or (ii) s is a valid signature on 0 ovk. In case (ii), s is a valid forgery on 0 ovk, since Type-2 adversaries use a one-time key which was never issued in a SimSign query. In case (i), since A wins and PC((p, m), w) = 1, we must have p / ∈ Q K , thus s is a valid forgery on 1 p.
C Proofs for the Construction of Attribute-Based Signatures
Privacy. Let A be an adversary against privacy of ABS. It is quite straightforward to build B breaking indistinguishability of PBS. B receives (pp, msk) from its challenger and forwards them to A as (pp, ask). 
Together this yields
Return 1 if all of the following hold:
Figure 12: Games defining zero-knowledge and simulation-sound extractability for NIZK
Return π ← Sign(sk, x, w)
The proofs that SIM of PBS implies zero knowledge of NIZK and that EXT of PBS implies simulationsound extractability of NIZK are straightforward.
Public-key encryption. In order to construct a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme from PBS, we note that policies can be interpreted as plaintexts hidden in a signature, which can be "decrypted" using extractability. Consider the following scheme PKE[PBS] constructed from PBS for PC s.t. PC((p, m * ), w * ) = 1 for some m * , w * and all p. Sahai [Sah99] shows that when instantiating the Naor-Yung [NY90] construction with a simulationsound NIZK, one obtains a chosen-ciphertext-attack (CCA)-secure public-key encryption scheme, which is what we require for our construction of group signatures in Section 6. Combining our constructions above of SSE NIZK and CPA PKE, we thus obtain a CCA-secure PKE; which we could also directly construct as follows:
Let PKE cpa = (KeyGen cpa , Enc cpa , Dec cpa ) be a CPA-secure PKE; let PBS be a policy-based signature scheme for the policy checker PC(((pk 0 , pk 1 ), (c 0 , c 1 )), (x, r 0 , r 1 )) = 1 ⇐⇒ c 0 = Enc pke (pk 0 , x; r 0 ) ∧ c 1 = Enc pke (pk 1 , x; r 1 ) (10) Then the following scheme PKE cca is an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme:
(pk 0 , dk 0 ) ←$ KeyGen cpa (1 λ ) (pk 1 , dk 1 ) ←$ KeyGen cpa (1 λ ) (pp, msk) ←$ Setup pbs (1 λ ) sk ←$ KeyGen(msk, (pk 0 , pk 1 )) Return pk ← (pk 0 , pk 1 , sk) dk ← (pp, dk 0 )
Enc cca ((pk 0 , pk 1 , sk), x) r 0 , r 1 ←$ {0, 1} Signatures of knowledge. Lastly, we show that PBS also imply another related primitive: In signatures of knowledge (SoK) [CL06] there is a setup outputting trusted parameters, but no authority. Anyone can make a signature on a message m w.r.t. an NP-relation R and a statement x, if they know a witness w for x, i.e., R(x, w) = 1. Security is defined by simulatability and extractability notions analogous to ours for PBS. We refer to [CL06] for the definitions.
To construct a SoK, we use a PBS which signs messages of the form (R, x, m) and require a signer to know a witness w for x w.r.t. R. In particular, let PBS be a PBS scheme for the policy checker PC s.t. for some policy p * we have: PC((p * , (R, x, m), w) = 1 iff R(x, w) = 1. Then we define: SimSetup sok , SimSign sok and Extr sok , as required by the security definitions are defined by replacing the respective PBS algorithms by their simulated variants. Extr sok runs Extr pbs to get (p, w) and returns w.
It is then straightforward to show that the above scheme satisfies both simulatability and extractability.
F Efficient Instantiations
Group signatures. The efficient instantiation of policy-based signatures given in Section 4.2 requires that the policy checker PC be expressible as a set of pairing-product equations. For our construction of group signatures from PBS in Section 6, this means that Equation (7) must be expressed as an equation of the form given in Equation (2). We thus need to express the predicate "is an encryption of my identity" as a statement in the language of pairing-product equations. The witness therefore must be a group element, so it seems that we need an encryption scheme whose randomness is a group element. It is however sufficient to find a group element which witnesses the fact that a ciphertext is the encryption of a certain plaintext.
Let user identities be elements I ∈ G and define the opener's public key as Y ∈ G. An ElGamal encryption of I under public key Y is defined by choosing r ←$ Z p and setting (C, D) ← (I · Y r , G r ). Using the bilinear map, W ← H r is a witness for encryption of I using the two equations: e(C, H) = e(I, H) e(Y, W ) e(D, H) = e(G, W )
Thus, for a policy I (which we identify with the user identity) and a message of the form (C, D, M ), the policy checker for our group-signature construction is defined as PC := {((I, (C, D, M )), W ) | (I, C, D, W ) satisfy Equation (11)} .
In order to efficiently instantiate our group-signature construction given in Section 6, we thus require a CCA-secure encryption, which contains as part of a ciphertext an ElGamal ciphertext, which we show how to construct next.
